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MICHAEL S. KNOLL∗

The Ancient Roots of Modern
Financial Innovation: The Early
History of Regulatory Arbitrage
1

R

ecent years have seen an explosion in financial innovation.
The typical, contemporary American investor has access to
financial services and instruments, such as exchange-traded stock
funds (“ETFs”), Treasury inflation-protected securities
(“TIPS”), and socially responsible index funds, that did not exist
2
a generation ago. Less obvious, but of equal significance, are
mortgage-backed securities and related developments that allow
lenders to hedge their interest rate risk. These developments
have made it possible for lenders to provide fixed-rate home
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1 FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND RISK
SHARING 3 (1994). For surveys of financial innovations, see id. at 17–31; Peter
Tufano, Financial Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE
307, 311–12 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003). For a survey of the
nascent empirical literature on financial innovation, see W. Scott Frame &
Lawrence J. White, Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation: Lots of Talk, Little
Action?, 42 J. ECON. LIT. 116 (2004).
2 See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 1, at 3–4.
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mortgages at lower rates than otherwise possible during times of
3
interest volatility.
The impact of financial innovation has been even greater on
Wall Street, which designs and sells innovative financial
contracts and establishes the markets where these contracts
trade, and Main Street, which has been an enthusiastic customer.
Many large companies use credit derivatives, Eurobonds,
interest-rate swaps, securitizations, and other recent financial
innovations to reduce borrowing costs, hedge risk, increase
earnings, reduce taxes, and speculate (sometimes with disastrous
4
results) on price movements.
The principle that underlies the rapid pace of financial
innovation is that cash flows can be disaggregated and rebundled
5
in almost unlimited combination. Not surprisingly, the rush of
new financial products has created nightmares for regulators,
6
who must fit new innovations into existing categories. The
pressure is not incidental. The exploitation of regulatory
7
inconsistencies is a major impetus for financial innovation.
8
Indeed, it might be the primary impetus. There is a strong
incentive to innovate around prohibited or disadvantaged
transactions. These innovations are commonly referred to as
9
regulatory arbitrage.
3 See John D. Finnerty, An Overview of Corporate Securities Innovation, 4 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 23, 25 (1992).
4 See id. at 24–37 (describing recent innovations and their uses).
5 See ROBERT L. MCDONALD, DERIVATIVES MARKETS 3–4, 463 (2003).
6 See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, Afterword, Apocalypse Not?, 50 TAX L. REV. 833,
833 (1995); Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of Financial
Instruments, 71 TEX. L. REV. 243, 245 (1992) (describing the tax law’s struggle to
keep up with the pace of financial innovation).
7 See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Charles W. Smithson, Financial Engineering: An
Overview, in THE HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 3, 10–12 (Clifford W.
Smith, Jr. & Charles W. Smithson eds., 1990) (providing four rationales for financial
innovation: tax and regulatory arbitrage, classic arbitrage, reducing the expected
costs of financial distress, and increasing the corporation’s debt capacity).
8 See MERTON H. MILLER, FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS AND MARKET
VOLATILITY 5–9 (1991). Merton Miller, who shared the 1990 Noble Prize in
Economics, argues this point.
9 For example, inconsistencies in the tax treatment of financial contracts are well
recognized and have produced an extensive literature. See, e.g., David F. Bradford,
Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency and Correctness in the
Taxation of F inancial Instruments, 50 TAX L. REV. 731 (1995) (proposing a method
of imposing a consistent income tax); David M. Schizer, Balance in the Taxation of
Derivative Securities: An Agenda for Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1886 (2004)
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Until recently, it was widely believed that most recent
financial innovations were distinctly modern without direct
10
antecedents. One reason for this view is that many financial
11
innovations rely on option theory, which is of recent vintage
12
and mathematically sophisticated. In general, option theory is
not accessible without training in advanced mathematics and
many of its results are not readily intuitive. However, in a series
of recent articles, leading finance experts have traced some
recent innovations–many of which are based on option
theory–back to the innovations’ roots. This literature has
succeeded in tracing some innovations back as far as four
13
hundred years.
This Article contributes to that literature by tracing the roots
of one specific application of one well-known technique. The
technique is put-call parity. The put-call parity theorem states
that given any three of the four following financial instruments–
a zero-coupon bond, a share of stock, a call option (“call”) on
the stock, and a put option (“put”) on the stock–the fourth
14
instrument can be replicated. Thus, the theorem implies that
any financial position that contains these assets can be
constructed in at least two different ways.
(arguing for balance because consistency is impossible); Herwig J. Schlunk, Little
Boxes: Can Optimal Commodity Tax Methodology Save the Debt-Equity
Distinction?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 859 (2002); Shuldiner, supra note 6, at 245 (describing
tax rules for financial instruments as “haphazard, incomplete, and inconsistent”);
Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 569, 587–93 (1994) (demonstrating that the tax treatments of debt and equity
are inconsistent); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Taxation of Options on the Issuer’s Stock,
TAXES, Mar. 2004, at 47 (tax treatment of issuer’s options are inconsistent with
treatments of issuer’s debt and equity); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing,
Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999)
(acknowledging that consistency is not possible).
10 E.g., MILLER, supra note 8, at 5.
11 See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973) (the seminal work on the subject).
12 A few minutes with a graduate-level text should convince most readers of the
field’s mathematical sophistication. See, e.g., JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES,
AND OTHER DERIVATIVES (4th ed. 2000); MCDONALD, supra note 5.
13 E.g., ALLEN & GALE, supra note 1, at 11–43; WILLIAM L. SILBER, FINANCIAL
INNOVATION (1975); Peter Tufano, Business Failure, Judicial Intervention, and
Financial Innovation: Restructuring U.S. Railroads in the Nineteenth Century, 71
BUS. HIST. REV. 1 (1997); Tufano, supra note 1, at 311–12; Peter Tufano, Securities
Innovation: A Historical and Functional Perspective, 7 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 90
(1995).
14 See infra Part I (discussing put-call parity theorem).
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Professor Hans Stoll first described put-call parity in 1969.
His article, “The Relation Between Put and Call Option
15
16
Prices,” is deservedly a classic. It has produced an extensive
academic literature and is the source of many important
17
innovations.
The application of put-call parity described in this Article is its
use to avoid usury by synthesizing a loan. Although first
described in the academic literature less than forty years ago,
put-call parity is more intuitive than many ideas in option
theory. Because it is so intuitive, the principle was being used
before it was formally described:
Put-call parity has been known for at least 100 years.
Legend has it that the relationship was discovered by one
Russell Sage, an extremely successful businessman in the 19th
century. At one point, state usury laws prohibited him from
making a high-interest-rate loan to a customer, so he bought
stock in a publicly traded company from the customer at the
market price. Simultaneously, he bought a put and wrote a call
on the underlying stock at fictitious prices, where the customer
took the opposite side of each transaction. This provided Mr.
Sage with a guaranteed rate of return on his investment . . . .
The customer, by always taking the opposite side, was
effectively borrowing at this guaranteed rate. The prices of the
options were set so that the rate of return to Mr. Sage was
above what the usury laws allowed. Bank examiners did not
prohibit this complex transaction, because
they could not
18
figure out that it was a loan in disguise.

15 Hans R. Stoll, The Relation Between Put and Call Option Prices, 24 J. FIN. 801
(1969).
16 See Douglas G. Baird, The Future of Law and Economics: Looking Forward,
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (1997) (arguing that trading in the options and
derivatives markets rests upon put-call parity).
17 See Michael S. Knoll, Put-Call Parity and the Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 61,
78–83, 85–89 (2002) (discussing how put-call parity has been used in recent years for
regulatory arbitrage and how modern financial innovations use put-call parity to
exploit inconsistencies in the tax law); see also David F. Levy, Towards Equal Tax
Treatment of Economically Equivalent Financial Instruments: Proposals for Taxing
Prepaid Forward Contracts, Equity Swaps, and Certain Contingent Debt
Instruments, 3 FLA. TAX. REV. 471, 511–12 (1997); Deborah L. Paul, Another
Uneasy Compromise: The Treatment of Hedging in a Realization Income Tax, 3
FLA. TAX REV. 1, 29–34 (1996); David M. Schizer, Frictions As a Constraint on Tax
Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312 (2001); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Commentary,
Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L. REV. 460
(1993).
18 STEPHEN A. ROSS, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & JEFFREY JAFFE,
CORPORATE FINANCE 554 (4th ed. 1999).
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The thesis of this Article is that put-call parity has been used
to engage in regulatory arbitrage for much longer than
previously believed. This Article traces the use of put-call parity
19
to evade usury restrictions back two thousand years.
This
Article also describes the important role put-call parity played in
developing the modern mortgage.
I
THE PUT-CALL PARITY THEOREM
A. The Basic Instruments
20

This Part describes the put-call parity theorem.
The first
step in illustrating the theorem is to describe the four financial
instruments that are its components. These four instruments are
a zero-coupon bond, a share of common stock (also called the
underlying asset for a reason that will soon be apparent), a call
on the stock, and a put on the stock. The call and the put both
have exercise prices equal to the face value of the zero-coupon
bond. The two options and the bond all mature on the same
date.
B. An Intuitive Proof of the Put-Call Parity Theorem

21

The put-call parity theorem states that the payoff from a
portfolio consisting of one share of stock, and the right to sell
that share (at date T for exercise price E), is equivalent to that
from a portfolio consisting of a zero-coupon bond (that pays E at
date T), and the right to buy one share of stock (at date T for
22
exercise price E).
Using the convention that a subscript T indicates the payoff
from holding an instrument at maturity and allowing S to denote
the underlying stock, P a put on that stock and C a call, both
with expiration date T and exercise price E, and E a zero-coupon
bond that pays E at date T, then the put-call parity theorem
19 Throughout this Article, I use the terms evasion and avoidance
interchangeably. Specifically, I do not make the distinction, well-known in tax law
literature, between permissible planning (avoidance) and impermissible planning
(evasion).
20 Readers familiar with put-call parity may want to skip ahead to infra Part II.
21 See ROSS, WESTERFIELD & JAFFE, supra note 18, at 552–54 (showing an
informal proof of the put-call parity theorem along the lines described below).
22 Id. at 552–54, 662–62.
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implies that the payoffs from the four securities at maturity have
the following relationship:
E + CT = ST + PT

(1)

Using PV(E) to denote the market price of a bond that will
23
pay E at date T, the claim that the market prices of the two
portfolios at any date prior to maturity are equal can be written
as follows:
PV(E) + C = S + P

(2)

where S is the market price of the stock and P and C are the
current premiums on the put and call.
There are several ways to demonstrate the put-call parity
theorem. The method most consistent with intuition is to
describe the bond in terms of the remaining instruments. The
convention with financial instruments is that a plus sign (+)
indicates that the instrument is held and a minus sign (–)
indicates that it is sold short in the case of the stock, borrowed in
the case of a bond, or written in the case of a put or call. Thus,
by subtracting C from both sides, Equation 2 can be rewritten as
follows:
PV(E) = S + P – C

(3)

Equation 3 shows that a zero-coupon bond that pays E at date
T is equivalent to a portfolio consisting of stock plus a put and a
call written on the stock, with the put and call sharing the same
exercise price (E) and maturity date (T). The intuition behind
the put-call parity theorem is that the held put ensures that the
stockholder will receive at least the strike price, whereas the
written call ensures that he will not receive any more. In other
words, the stockholder will receive exactly the strike price, which
24
is what a zero-coupon bond pays.
23

PV(E) is the present value of E to be received at time T.
That intuition is demonstrated using a bond that pays $100 on March 1, 2009,
one share of Google, a put that gives the holder the right to sell one share of Google
to the writer for $100 on March 1, 2009, and a call that gives the holder the right to
purchase one share of Google from the writer for $100 on March 1, 2009. A
portfolio consisting of one share of Google, a put held on Google at $100, and a call
written on Google at $100, with both the put and the call maturing on March 1,
2009, will pay $100 on that date regardless of the price of Google on that date. If
Google is selling for less than $100, the written call will expire worthless. The stock
and the put will together be worth $100. Alternatively, if Google is selling for more
than $100, the put expires worthless and the stock and the written call are together
24
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Proof of the put-call parity theorem is through a no-arbitrage
argument. If Equation 3 were violated, then arbitragers could
borrow using the higher-priced side, invest in the lower-priced
side, and pocket the difference. The arbitrager’s profit from
such a strategy would be guaranteed because at maturity the
payoff from the held side of Equation 3 would match the
25
obligation on the borrowed side.
If such riskless profit
opportunities were available, arbitragers would want to enter
into these transactions as much as possible. Because arbitragers
are not earning large and riskless arbitrage profits, it follows that
the price of the bond at any date prior to maturity must equal
the cost of assembling the equivalent portfolio. That is to say to
prevent limitless arbitrage Equation 3 must hold.

worth $100 because the written call takes away the increase above $100. Finally, if
the stock is worth exactly $100, the put and call both expire worthless, so the
portfolio is again worth $100. Therefore, whatever the price of Google at maturity,
the portfolio will be worth exactly $100. Of course, the financial instrument that
provides $100 on March 1, 2009, regardless of the price of Google is a $100 zerocoupon bond maturing on that date.
25 The notion is that if the portfolio is cheaper than the bond, an investor can
make unlimited arbitrage profits by borrowing (shorting the bond) to purchase the
portfolio, and conversely. Assume on March 1, 2009, the market price of Google is
$80, the put premium is $25, and the call premium is $15. The cost to the investor of
purchasing the stock and the put is $105 and the investor receives $15 for writing
the call. Thus, the cost of assembling the portfolio is $90 ($105 – $15). If the price
of the bond on March 1, 2009, is above $90, say $92, arbitrage is possible: the
investor can short the bond (borrow) receiving $92 and take $90 to assemble the
portfolio. The investor will pocket $2. On March 1, 2009, she will get $100 for her
portfolio, which will be just enough to pay principal and interest on the money
borrowed. The investor, thus, makes $2 on no investment. The investor and many
others would like to do as much of this arbitrage as possible. Thus, the price of the
bond on March 1, 2009, cannot be above $90. Similarly, if the price of the bond on
March 1, 2009, is below $90, say $88, the investor can make an arbitrage profit by
shorting the portfolio and purchasing the bond. The investor shorts the portfolio
consisting of one share of Google, the put on Google, and the written call on
Google by shorting the share, writing the put, and purchasing the call. If the
investor follows this strategy, she will receive $90. Taking $88 to purchase the bond
leaves her with $2. At maturity, the bond yields the investor $100, which she can
use to pay the $100 owed on the shorted portfolio. Thus, by an argument similar to
the one above, the price of the bond cannot be below $90. Therefore, it follows that
the price of the bond is $90, the cost of assembling the original portfolio.
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C. Extending the Basic Put-Call Parity Relationship

26

Equation 3 describes the simplest, and most intuitive, way to
avoid usury laws through put-call parity. However, in order to
understand the oldest transactions, it is helpful to look at an
extension of put-call parity.
Equation 3, which describes the put-call parity theorem,
27
assumes that the underlying stock pays no dividends. When
the underlying stock pays dividends, the right side of Equation 3
is more valuable than the left, because in addition to receiving E
at T, the stockholder also receives dividends. The present value
of dividends that will be received on the stock from now until T
is represented by PV(D). When the stock pays dividends, putcall parity implies that:
PV(E) + PV(D) = S + P – C

(4)

Equation 4 states that holding a bond that pays interest is
equivalent to a portfolio consisting of dividend-paying stock plus
a held put and a written call on that stock. Conceptually, the
dividend stream can be thought of as a second bond (PV(D))
that must be added to the zero-coupon bond (PV(E)) on the left
side of the equation for equality to hold.
The zero-coupon bonds described in Equations 3 and 4 above
were assumed to have no risk of default. Put-call parity can also
be used to represent loans where payment is not assured. There
is a class of loans in which the lender agrees not to pursue the
borrower personally if the borrower refuses to repay the loan in
28
full.
Instead, the lender takes a security interest in the

26 Variations of the put-call parity theorem apply when the stock pays dividends,
interest rates vary, and American options replace European options. They are
more complex, less intuitive, and often contain inequalities. Moreover, greater
generality reduces the tightness of the arbitrage conditions. See ROBERT A.
JARROW & ANDREW RUDD, OPTION PRICING 51–56, 69–79 (1983). However,
under more general specifications, there are still strong arbitrage conditions that, if
unchecked, would permit the tax and regulatory arbitrage described below.
27 Dividends are periodic payments to the record holder of a share of stock as of
the dividend date. Thus, when the stock goes ex-dividend, the price will drop. Most
companies do not vary their dividends, so the payments are usually known to
investors far in advance.
28 See, e.g., Kemba J. Dunham & Rachel Emma Silverman, Burned by Real
Estate, Some Just Walk Away: But Abandoning Investment Property to Foreclosure
Carries a Very High Cost; Slashed Credit Scores, Vulnerable Assets, WALL ST. J.,
Oct.
18,
2007,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/
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borrower’s property. In the event of default, the lender will use
the property to satisfy its claim. If the value of the property
securing the loan is less than the amount due on the loan, then
the lender is out the shortfall. Such a loan is called nonrecourse
because the lender has no recourse against the borrower
personally if the borrower refuses to pay.
Using option terminology, the lender has written a put to the
borrower that allows the borrower to sell the mortgaged
29
property to the lender for the outstanding loan balance.
Rearranging Equations 3 and 4, the put-call parity theorem can
be rewritten as:
PV(E) – P = S – C

(3')

and
PV(E) + PV(D) – P = S – C

(4')

Comparing the left sides of Equations 3' and 4' to the left
sides of Equations 3 and 4 shows that a lender’s payoff from a
nonrecourse loan is equivalent to that of a recourse loan plus a
put written to the borrower. As Equations 3' and 4' show, putcall parity implies that the lender’s payoff from a nonrecourse
loan is equivalent to that from owning the mortgaged asset and
writing a call on that asset.
II
RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF THE PROHIBITION ON USURY
Limitations on the interest rate a lender can charge are
30
widespread. They are also of ancient origin. Such prohibitions
31
can be traced back to the Pentateuch, or Five Books of Moses.
Perhaps the most famous condemnation of interest comes from
Deuteronomy: “Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother;
SB119266868024662861.html (“In a nonrecourse loan, lenders can take only the
property itself to satisfy the debt.”).
29 It only makes sense for the borrower to exercise this put if the mortgaged
property is worth less than the amount outstanding. If the property is worth more,
the borrower is better off selling the property, repaying the loan, and keeping the
difference.
30 For a brief history of usury laws, see Wayne A.M. Visser & Alastair McIntosh,
A Short Review of the Historical Critique of Usury, 8 ACCT., BUS. & FIN. HIST. 175
(1998).
31 See id.

KNOLL.FMT

102

12/8/2008 11:04:48 AM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87, 93

usury of money, usury of victuals, usury of any thing that is lent
upon usury. Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but
32
unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon usury . . . .”
Deuteronomy thus forbade the ancient Israelites from
charging interest on loans to fellow Israelites. However, for
loans to outsiders there was no such prohibition: the Israelites
33
were free to charge them interest.
Similar condemnations appear elsewhere in the Pentateuch.
For example, Exodus directs, “If thou lend money to any of my
people that is poor by me, thou shalt not be to him as an userer,
34
neither shalt thou lay upon him usury.”
Further, Leviticus contains a lengthy list of rules for the
Israelites to follow in their commercial dealings with one
another. These rules can be read as exhorting the Israelites to
deal fairly and leniently with one another. One passage from
Leviticus cautions, “Take thou no usury of him, or increase: but
fear thy God; that thy brother may live with thee. Thou shalt
not give him thy money upon usury, nor lend him thy victuals for
35
increase.”
The ancient Israelite’s condemnation of interest was later
picked up and expanded by both Christianity and Islam.
Christianity universalized this prohibition by prohibiting its
followers from charging interest on loans made to anyone,
36
Christian or not. The best-known condemnation of interest in
the Gospels is from Luke. The passage exhorts Christians to
37
“lend, hoping for nothing again.”
More recently, Islam extended the usury prohibition by
prohibiting the faithful from both charging and paying interest.
32

Deuteronomy 23:19–20 (King James).
Professors Edward Glaeser and José Scheinkman argue that ancient usury
prohibitions were a primitive form of social insurance. See Edward L. Glaeser &
José Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of
Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws, 41 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1998).
34 Exodus 22:25 (King James) (emphasis removed).
35 Leviticus 25:36–37 (King James).
36 See SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 70
(3d ed. 1996) (noting that Saint Jerome (AD 340–420) is credited with
universalizing the prohibition). The antiusury movement reached its zenith in
Europe when Pope Clement V (AD 1311) made the ban absolute and declared all
secular laws permitting usury null and void. Visser & McIntosh, supra note 30, at
178.
37 Luke 6:35 (King James).
33
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The Qur’an contains stern admonitions against riba, most
38
simply, “God has forbidden riba.” However, the Qur’an does
not explain whether riba, which literally means “increase,” refers
39
to all interest, or just unfairly high interest.
The answer to that question comes from the Sunna, which is
the second-most important source of religious authority for
40
Muslims.
It contains statements attributed to the Prophet
Muhammad that are not contained in the Qur’an. Several
passages provide the basis for Islam’s broad usury prohibition.
The passage that most clearly states that any interest is
41
prohibited reads: “Every loan . . . that attracts a benefit is riba.”
The most famous passage in the Sunna on riba both prohibits
lending at interest and clearly extends that prohibition to paying
interest: “Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley
for barley, dates for dates, salt for salt, each kind for each kind,
in hand; he who increases or asks for increase commits [r]iba . . .,
42
alike whether he gives or takes.”
III
MUSLIMS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM
Islam’s prohibition on paying interest has made it difficult for
43
many Muslims living in the West to purchase a home. As a
38 Qur’an 2:275. The quotation in the text is from a translation provided by
Chibli Mallat, The Debate on Riba and Interest in Twentieth Century Jurisprudence,
in ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE 69, 69 (Chibli Mallat ed., 1988).
39 See FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES, III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE:
RELIGION, RISK, AND RETURN 72–73 (1998).
40 M. KABIR HASSAN & MERVYN K. LEWIS, Glossary, in HANDBOOK OF
ISLAMIC BANKING xviii (M. Kabir Hassan & Mervyn K. Lewis eds., 2007).
41 The quotation in the text is from a translation provided by VOGEL & HAYES,
supra note 39, at 73.
42 The quotation in the text is from a translation provided by Mallat, supra note
38, at 69 n.1 (emphasis added).
43 See Neal Gendler, Finance Methods Could Allow More Muslims to Own
Homes: Several Groups Are Looking for Ways to Help Minnesota’s Growing
Muslim Population Buy Homes Without Violating Islamic Principles, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), May 19, 2000, at 5B; Yuki Noguchi, Matching Faith and Finances:
Alternatives to Loans Cater to Area Muslims, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1999, at E1;
Alison Steed, Midweek Money: Borrow in Good Faith; A New Scheme Offers
Muslims Mortgage Loans That Don’t Break Islamic Law, INDEP. (London), Feb. 3,
1999, at 11. Observant Muslims need to have enough cash to pay the full purchase
price, whereas the typical U.S. home buyer provides ten percent, or even as little as
five percent, of the purchase price to qualify for a mortgage.
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result, this prohibition has spurred some innovative home
financing techniques that use put-call parity. In one transaction,
the bank buys the house and sells it to its client for a higher price
44
through an installment sale. Thus, instead of owning the house
(S) and taking out a mortgage (-PV(E)), which would be written
as S – PV(E), the client has agreed to buy the house in the future
45
for E, which can be written as C – P.
Although the two
transactions are in substance equivalent, they differ in form.
From the bank’s perspective, it owns the house (S) subject to the
agreement to sell it to its client (-C + P). Thus, the bank’s
position, which can be written as S – C + P, is from put-call
46
parity equivalent to PV(E), a simple loan.
This simple cost-plus profit financing transaction is called
murabaha. While murabaha transactions have traditionally been
47
used for trade finance, they are now also being used to provide
48
home mortgages. As illustrated above, the murabaha contract
uses Equation 3 (or Equation 3' if it replicates a nonrecourse
49
loan) to avoid usury.
The murabaha transaction also raises many potential legal
issues, such as whether the bank as an owner of the property can
be held liable in environmental litigation, whether the bank is a
mortgage lender and subject to the applicable laws, whether the
bank’s income is interest or capital gain, and whether the bank
can use the installment method to report gain (which is available

44 See Adam Jones, No-Interest Loan Has Poor Take-Up, TIMES (London), Jan.
17, 1998, at G4.
45 Technically, the contract is not a simple forward, but a series of forward
contracts. In a forward contract, the holder is obliged to purchase the underlying
asset from the writer. Thus, a held forward combines a held call and a written put,
so it can be written as C – P.
46 If the bank cannot force its client to later pay for the house, then the client has
a call (C), which is equivalent to owning the house and financing it with a
nonrecourse mortgage (S – PV(E) + P). The bank holds the property subject to a
call (S – C), which is equivalent to holding a nonrecourse mortgage (PV(E) – P).
47 Tarek S. Zaher & M. Kabir Hassan, A Comparative Literature Survey of
Islamic Finance and Banking, 10 FIN. MARKETS, INST. & INSTRUMENTS 155, 160
(2001).
48 E.g., Jones, supra note 44.
49 The murabaha transaction uses the simpler versions of put-call parity without
dividends because the bank’s profit comes from the difference between the
purchase price and sales price.
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only for capital gains). The murabaha also provides the bank
with a higher rate of return if the client sells the house before the
bank is repaid in full because the client must repay the bank
early. If the sale occurs very soon after purchase, the transaction
could violate state usury laws if those laws treat the transaction
51
as a covered loan.
In a slightly more complicated variation, the bank buys the
house and enters into a contract to sell it to the client for the
same price in a series of installment payments over a number of
years. The bank also agrees to rent the client that portion of the
52
house the client does not own. If the client fails to make the
payments, the bank will take over the house and sell it. Thus,
the client has the option to buy the entire house by making all of
53
the payments (C). Put-call parity implies that this transaction
is equivalent to the client owning the house (S) and financing it
54
with a nonrecourse mortgage (-PV(D) – PV(E) + P). From the
bank’s perspective, it owns the house, has rented it, and has
written a call on it (S – C), which is economically equivalent to
making a nonrecourse loan with the house as collateral
55
(PV(D) + PV(E) – P).
The above leasing transaction with an option to purchase is
called an ijara wa-iqtina. It is similar to a financial lease with an

50 See Zaher & Hassan, supra note 47, at 160 (raising similar legal questions in the
context of trade finance).
51 In effect, the murabaha provides for a predetermined amount of interest. If
the loan is repaid early, the effective periodic interest rate is increased. See
HASSAN & LEWIS, supra note 40, at 320.
52 Noguchi, supra note 43. If the rental rate is fixed, the transaction is similar to a
fixed-rate mortgage; if the rental rate varies over time, it is similar to a variable rate
mortgage. See Steed, supra note 43, at 11; Marla Dickerson, The Price of Piety in
Islam, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1999, at A1.
53 Technically, this is not a single option, but is a series of embedded options.
Each month, the client has to decide whether to make the next payment, in which
case it has the right to continue to make payments, or to stop making payments. If
it chooses the latter, the bank takes the property and presumably sells it.
54 The borrower’s right to walk away from the transaction by transferring the
property to the lender is the right to sell the property to the lender for the
outstanding balance of the loan. Thus, this right is a put option.
55 If the bank can force its client to later purchase the house, then the client has
also written a put, which leaves it in position C – P, which is equivalent to owning
the house and financing it with a recourse mortgage (S – PV(D) – PV(E)). The
bank holds the property subject to a call and holds a put (S – C + P), which is
equivalent to holding a recourse mortgage (PV(D) + PV(E)).
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option to purchase. In contrast with the murabaha transaction,
it uses Equation 4 (or Equation 4' if the bank is replicating a
nonrecourse loan) because the client pays rent to the bank. This
rent is PV(D) in Equation 4 (and Equation 4'). As with the
murabaha, the ijara wa-iqtina raises similar legal issues because
57
the bank holds title to the land. One advantage of the ijara
wa-iqtina over the murabaha is that the ijara wa-iqtina does not
result in an excessively high implicit interest rate if the occupant
sells the house soon after moving in. This is because the bank’s
profit from this rent-to-purchase transaction comes from the rent
it receives. Because repurchasing the house ends the obligation
to pay rent, an early repurchase reduces the total implicit
interest in the transaction.
Islamic mortgage substitutes raise significant regulatory
questions. In the United States, commercial banks are generally
prohibited from owning real estate other than their own
58
premises.
As a result, experts questioned whether Islamic
home mortgage substitutes, which avoid the prohibition on
interest by transferring ownership to a bank, were consistent
59
with U.S. banking laws. About ten years ago, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), which regulates
commercial banks, addressed that question directly. In 1997 and
1999, it issued two rulings to the United Bank of Kuwait
60
approving Islamic real estate financings.
In approving the
products, the OCC looked past the forms of the transactions to
their substance and recognized that in substance these
transactions were “functionally equivalent to or a logical
61
outgrowth of” preexisting approved financial products.
In
effect, the OCC was using put-call parity when it recognized

56

See Zaher & Hassan, supra note 47, at 160.
See id. at 161 (raising these questions in the context of capital leases).
58 12 U.S.C. § 29 (2008).
59 See Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Regulation of Islamic Financial Services in the
United States (Mar. 2, 2005), available at http://newyorkfed.org/newsevents/
speeches/2005/bax050302.html.
60 Off. Comptroller Currency Interpretive Letter No. 806 (Oct. 17, 1997) [1997–
1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,253 (Islamic home
financing leases); Off. Comptroller Currency Interpretive Letter No. 867 (June 1,
1999) [1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,361
(murabaha financing products).
61 See Baxter, supra note 59.
57
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that, in spite of their form, the transactions were in substance
lending transactions.
In contrast with the OCC, which has provided explicit public
guidance on Islamic financial products, the Treasury has not
62
Yet some Islamic financial
provided any such guidance.
services institutions claim that a portion of the individuals’
payments will be deductible as interest on home mortgage
indebtedness and send Forms 1098 to their clients, presumably
relying on opinions from their lawyers that these transactions are
63
in substance loans at interest.
The argument that these
transactions should be treated similarly to other mortgages is the
argument that substance should trump form and that in
substance these transactions are interest-bearing loans. Once
again, the economic equivalence of Islamic financial transactions
and traditional real estate mortgages is an application of put-call
parity.
Regardless of how these transactions are reported on the
parties’ tax returns, Muslims who finance their homes through
these transactions seek assurances that they are not paying
interest in violation of shari’a. Accordingly, both murabaha and
ijara wa-iqtina transactions are supported by opinions from
clerics and scholars that these transactions are consistent with
64
shari’a.
These opinions typically focus on the transaction’s
form, which does not provide for any explicit interest.
Nonetheless, some experts believe these transactions are
65
impermissible disguised loans. These critics are implicitly using
66
put-call parity to look through these transactions.
62 The research librarians at the University of Pennsylvania and I could not find
any explicit cases or rulings on the taxation of Islamic financial products. A similar
search conducted by Joel Newman several years earlier turned up no direct sources.
Joel S. Newman, Islamic and Jewish Perspectives on Interest, 89 TAX NOTES 1311,
1317 (2000). Such rulings are mentioned or implied in some news stories. E.g.,
Cathleen Falsani, The American Dream: Lease-to-Own Company Could Ease
Tensions, DAILY SOUTHTOWN (Ill.), Sept. 13, 1999; Noguchi, supra note 43.
63 See Newman, supra note 62, at 1312.
64 See Paul Slade, Family Finance: Ethical Mortgages for Muslims, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 14, 1999, at 11.
65 See Dickerson, supra note 52 (“Islamic banking isn’t without its critics, most of
whom are Muslims wary of financial institutions using religion as a marketing tool.
Some view the ‘fees,’ ‘markups,’ and ‘profit-sharing,’ of Islamic transactions as a
thinly veiled subterfuge for interest.”). For discussions of shari’a boards–groups of
scholars that opine on whether financial contracts are consistent with Islamic
principles–see Michael McMillen, Islamic Capital Markets, Developments and
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IV
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORTGAGE IN
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND
Today, London is a major banking center, and the London
Inter-Bank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) is a benchmark interest
67
rate for financial transactions. It has not always been that way.
The medieval Church prohibited lenders from charging any
68
interest at all.
To satisfy the dictates of both church and
finance, the following arrangement became standard in feudal
England where land was one of the few assets that could secure a
loan. A landholder would transfer legal title (a fee interest) to a
financier in exchange for cash. The transfer would be made
subject to the condition that the original landholder could
reclaim his land by repaying the financier on a predetermined
69
and contractually set date, called law day. The return to the
financier, excluding any gain if the land was not reclaimed, came
from taking possession of the land and collecting rents and
70
profits generated by the land.
If, however, the original
landholder failed to reclaim the land on law day, the financier
71
kept the land.

Issues, 1 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 136, 139–41 (2006); M. Umer Chapra & Habib
Ahmed, Corporate Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions (Islamic Dev. Bank,
Occasional Paper No. 6, 2002); Wafik Grais & Matteo Pellegrini, Corporate
Governance and Sharrah Compliance in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial
Services (World Bank Policy, Working Paper No. 4054, Nov. 2006).
66 See generally Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, “Interest” and the Paradox of
Contemporary Islamic Law and Finance, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 108, 109 (2003)
(criticizing Islamic jurists who condemn traditional interest-based financing while
profiting from its Islamic twin).
67 Gillian Tett, Libor’s Value Is Called into Question, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007.
68 Visser & McIntosh, supra note 30, at 178.
69 For discussions of this medieval English land transaction, see GRANT S.
NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 6–9 (3d ed. 1994);
Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale As De Facto
Strict Foreclosure–An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent
Resale, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 850, 855–56 (1985).
70 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 69, at 7.
71 Id. Because the financier did not have the right to put the land back to the
original owner, the transaction was the equivalent of a nonrecourse mortgage.
Without the put, the financier’s position is S – C, which is equivalent to PV(E) – P.
The medieval lending transaction closely follows the put-call parity theorem: the
transfer of the land for cash is the purchase of the underlying asset by the lender
(S), and granting the borrower the right to redeem is the writing of a call (-C).
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From the perspective of the financier, the financier owned and
wrote a put on the land (S – C). Through put-call parity, this
transaction was equivalent to making a nonrecourse loan
(PV(D) + PV(E) – P). In this formulation, PV(E) represents the
loan principal and PV(D) represents the rents and profits
generated from the land. The original landowner held a call on
the
land
(C),
which
is
equivalent
to
owning
the land subject to a nonrecourse interest-bearing mortgage (S –
72
PV(D) – PV(E) + P).
The above medieval financial transaction is the predecessor to
73
the modern real estate mortgage. The financier was allowed to
keep the land if the original landowner did not pay on law day,
even if the original landowner was not at fault for the failure.
For example, if the financier was unavailable on law day, he
could keep the land because the law courts read these contracts
to make time of the essence. Although the law courts would not
intervene on behalf of the original landowner, the English
Chancery Court would. The English Chancery Court granted
relief to original landowners who were only slightly late in
tendering and established specific equitable grounds, such as
fraud. The English Chancery Court then required that the
financier accept the tender and transfer the property back. By
the seventeenth century, the intervention of the equity courts
was routine. Selling landowners had the right to redeem their
land from their purchasers by tendering principal and interest
within a reasonable time after law day and without establishing
explicit equitable grounds. This right to late redemption, which
is now known as the equity of redemption, was the first
74
mortgagor protection law.
The equity of redemption, however, created a problem. It
imposed an indefinite cloud on mortgagees’ titles, discouraging
mortgagees from improving their land and making it difficult to

72 The transaction uses Equation 4', not Equation 3', because the land generates
the return to the financier.
73 In some states, mostly in the Southeast, the mortgagee has legal title to the
mortgaged real estate. However, in the majority of states, the mortgagor retains
title. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 69, at 7; 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §
37.03 (Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan eds., 1997).
74 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 69, at 7.
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75

transfer land. The need for the mortgagee to be free from the
mortgagor’s right to redeem after a reasonable time led the
equity courts to develop the mortgagee’s right to foreclose the
mortgagor’s equity of redemption. Such foreclosure, when
granted by a court of equity, forever cut off the mortgagor’s right
76
to redeem. The defining characteristic of a mortgage is this
equity of redemption and the requirement that a mortgagee
foreclose that equity before the mortgaged property can be used
to satisfy the debt.
As the above paragraphs illustrate, there were two significant
differences between a formal loan, the left side of Equation 4',
and a synthesized loan, the right side of Equation 4'. First, the
formal loan at interest was prohibited as usurious, whereas the
economically equivalent synthesized loan was not. Second, the
financier had greater rights in the event of default with the
synthesized loan than with the formal loan. For example, if the
borrower on a formal loan defaulted, the lender had to sue the
77
borrower to collect. The lender could not seize the defaulting
borrower’s property. In contrast with the formal loan, the
financier held title to the land with the synthesized loan. That
title would indefeasibly vest if the loan was not repaid in full on
law day. Although that additional security might have been one
reason for using a synthesized loan, the prohibition on usury
made formal loans with interest impossible. Thus, the difference
in substantive rights between the two economically equivalent
transactions became important. It was in reaction to these legal
rights, and the perception that the rights that the financier held
with the synthesized loan were unfair to the original landowner,
that the English Chancery Court created the equity of
redemption and required the foreclosure of that interest. In this

75 The title is not improved by transfer. The transferee can only receive the title
held by the transferor.
76 This form of foreclosure is called strict foreclosure because the land is forfeited
to the mortgagee. Strict foreclosure is rarely used in the United States today.
Foreclosure in the United States is by sale and any proceeds generated by the sale
above what is owed the mortgagee are used first to satisfy other secured creditors of
the mortgagor and thereafter paid to the mortgagor. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra
note 69, at 9.
77 Such a suit would have been brought in the law court and would have been
subject to the slow process and technical pleading requirements of those courts and
times.
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way, put-call parity played a crucial role in the development of
the modern mortgage.
However, the use of put-call parity to avoid the prohibition on
usury goes back still further. Almost the identical transactional
structure was used fifteen hundred years earlier.
V
ANCIENT ISRAEL, DEUTERONOMY, AND THE TALMUD
The Talmud is the summary of the oral law of the Jews that
78
had evolved over centuries. It was written by sages who lived
in Palestine and Babylon roughly two thousand years ago and
contains two main components: the Mishnah, a book of law, and
79
the Gemerah, a commentary upon that law.
The Mishnah
deals with a wide range of subjects. Many of these subjects are
principally religious, such as prayers, the Sabbath, festivals,
rituals, and dietary laws. Other subjects are primarily secular.
One of the latter topics is civil law, often called monetary law.
Monetary law was a particularly rich area for discussion. The
sages recognized that many matters of purely religious law could
remain unchanged for long periods, but monetary law must
80
change to keep up with the times. As a result, the Talmud took
the few monetary laws recorded in the Torah and elaborated and
81
The
adopted those laws for contemporary circumstances.
monetary laws are divided into three parts, called gates. The
first deals with harms inflicted by one person upon another, what
we call torts; a second deals with partnerships, sales, and legal
documents; and a third deals with disputes over money and
loans.
The second gate is called the Baba Metzia and many of its
entries deal with attempts to evade the prohibition on usury.
Thus, there is a series of passages holding many interestavoidance transactions to be usurious. For example, one cannot
make an interest-free loan of money and simultaneously require
the borrower to perform service or provide free or reduced-cost
82
lodging. Such prohibitions, although important for maintaining
78
79
80
81
82

ADIN STEINSALTZ, THE ESSENTIAL TALMUD 3–4 (1976).
Id. at 4.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 146.
Mishnah Baba Metzia 5:2 (Herbert Danby trans., Oxford University Press).
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the usury prohibition, do not implicate put-call parity. However,
elsewhere in the Mishnah, there is a discussion that touches
upon put-call parity. The relevant passage reads: “If a man sold
a house from among the houses in a walled city, he may redeem
it at once and at any time during twelve months. This is a kind
83
of usury, which is yet not usury.”
The above passage deals with a practice that allowed
individuals who sold their houses out of financial need to reclaim
their houses if they repaid the purchaser within a year. This
practice comes from a passage in Leviticus that reads as follows:
If a man sells a house in a walled city, he retains the right of
redemption a full year after its sale. During that time, he may
redeem it. If it be not redeemed within the space of a full year,
then the house that is in the walled city shall be established
for
84
ever to him that bought it throughout his generations . . . .

When read in conjunction with the passage from Leviticus, the
Mishnah passage indicates that the sages understood that the
sale and later redemption of a house (at the same price) provides
the purchaser with interest in the form of implicit services (the
shelter provided by the house that the purchaser would
otherwise have to acquire by renting another house). This is
what is meant by the phrase, “[t]his is a kind of usury.”
However, the sages concluded that the transaction could not be
prohibited. Their unstated, but obvious, reason was that the
right of redemption was explicitly provided in Leviticus.
Moreover, the sages in the passage from the Mishnah ask the
put-call parity question: is a transaction that pays interest in
substance but not in form prohibited? The sages understood
that a seller who redeems his house has implicitly paid interest to
the buyer in the form of the services provided by the house. The
sages further understood that the sale with a right to redeem was
85
the economic equivalent of an impermissible loan. The passage
further suggests that the sages might have condemned the
practice if it was not explicitly approved in Leviticus. Thus, at
some level the rabbis of the Talmud had an intuitive
understanding of put-call parity.

83

Id. Arakhin 9:3 (footnotes omitted).
Leviticus 25:29–30 (King James).
85 The logic was described in supra Part IV in connection with the medieval
transaction.
84

KNOLL.FMT

2008]

12/8/2008 11:04:48 AM

The Ancient Roots of Modern Financial Innovation

113

An especially interesting passage immediately follows the
passage from the Mishnah quoted above:
If the [last] day of the twelve months was come and it was
not redeemed, it became his for ever, no matter whether he
bought it or was given it was a gift, for it is written, [i]n
perpetuity. Beforetime the buyer used to hide himself on the
last day of the twelve months so that [the house] might be his
for ever; but Hillel the Elder ordained that he [that sold it]
could deposit his money in the [Temple] Chamber, and break
down the door and enter, and that
the other, when he would,
86
might come and take his money.

The abuse, and its resolution, in the above passage is
strikingly similar to the English experience fifteen hundred years
87
later. The tendency for some buyers to hide from redeeming
sellers strongly suggests that some buyers and sellers understood
that these transactions were intended to be loans. They
appeared to have an intuitive sense of this relationship and
understood the equivalence between an impermissible loan and
a permissible sale followed by a redemption. Moreover, this
intuition was used to develop a transaction that was able to
withstand scrutiny because the authorities could not prohibit the
synthesized loan since it was explicitly approved in Leviticus.
Thus, the intuition that underlies put-call parity was likely being
used more than two thousand years ago to engage in regulatory
arbitrage.
VI
THE MODERN PROHIBITION ON CLOGGING THE EQUITY OF
REDEMPTION
More recently, some lenders have used put-call parity to try to
88
evade mortgagor protection laws. Modern mortgage lenders
rarely attempt to avoid the prohibition on usury because the

86 Mishnah, supra note 82, Arakhin 9:4 (some alterations added) (emphasis
omitted).
87 Rabbi Hillel, the Elder’s resolution in Mishnah Arakhin 9:4, can be thought of
as the forerunner of the equity of redemption.
88 For discussions of the range of devices employed by lenders to avoid
foreclosure and of the aggressiveness of courts in preventing such clogging, see
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 69, at ch. 3; John C. Murray, Clogging Revisited,
33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 279 (1998).
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maximum legal interest rate is usually well above market rates.
However, many lenders are interested in cutting off the
mortgagor’s equity of redemption and other mortgagor
90
protections.
The right of a mortgagor to redeem after default and the
requirement that the mortgagee foreclose are considered
91
inseparable incidents of the mortgage.
The parties cannot
92
legally contract around these rights. In addition, there are a
plethora of statutory mortgagor protection provisions that vary
from state to state. These include statutory (post-foreclosure)
redemption, fair value legislation, prohibition of deficiency
93
judgments, and the one-action rule.
While the wisdom of
94
requiring such mortgagor protections has been questioned, all
95
states impose one or more forms of protection. Over the years,
89 Modern mortgage interest rates do not bump up against usury laws as they did
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. See, e.g., Steve Frazier, Texas Lenders and Home
Builders Assail Law Setting Floating Rates on Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1979;
Jonathan Kaufman, Mortgage Lending Dries Up in Midwest Due to Fed’s Actions
and Usury Statutes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1979 (“Twenty-two states, including Iowa,
Illinois and Wisconsin, have usury laws that currently keep mortgage interest rates
below 12%. The Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago . . . lends S&Ls money at
13.5%. . . . ‘There’s no way S&Ls can make money on mortgages if they then charge
12%.’”).
90 When a mortgagor defaults, the lender cannot take the mortgaged property
and sell it to satisfy the claim. In most jurisdictions, the mortgagor cannot even
evict the mortgagee immediately. Instead, the mortgagor remains in possession of
the property and has a period of time to cure the default. Only once the right to
cure the default, the equity of redemption, has expired can the mortgagee go to
court and get an order foreclosing the equity of redemption. In the United States
this results in a public sale of the property. The proceeds of the sale are used to pay
the mortgagor’s obligation to the mortgagee and other secured creditors of the
mortgagor after which any excess is returned to the mortgagor.
91 AM. LAW INST., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 3.1(a), (b) (1997)
(the mortgagor in default has the right to redeem the real estate until a valid
foreclosure and any agreement limiting that right is normally ineffective).
92 Roger A. Cunningham & Saul Tischler, Disguised Real Estate Security
Transactions As Mortgages in Substance, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 7 n.20 (1972).
This is known as the prohibition on clogging the mortgagor’s equity of redemption.
93 Usually, these protections cannot be waived when the mortgage is created,
although they frequently can be waived at a later date. NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra note 69, at 41.
94 See Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77
VA. L. REV. 489, 496–98 (1991) (sources cited in footnotes). Professor Schill is
more sanguine about such protections. Id. at 498–500 (mortgagor protection laws
promote efficiency as a form of insurance for the risk averse).
95 See id. at 492 n.6 (stating that, for example, only Connecticut and Vermont
permit strict foreclosure and even those states have other mortgagor protections).
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many mortgagees have tried to avoid the mortgagor’s equity of
redemption and statutory mortgagor protections by taking title
to the land and agreeing to transfer it to the borrower in
exchange for repayment. The use of an absolute deed with some
form of collateral agreement for reconveyance upon payment is
often intended to eliminate the grantor’s equity of redemption
96
and avoid statutory mortgagor protections.
For example, if a lender and a borrower agree that the lender
will make a one-year $100,000 recourse loan to the borrower at
ten percent to be secured by land owned by the borrower, the
parties can accomplish this result and avoid a formal loan in two
different ways. First, the original landowner can sell the land to
the financier for $100,000, write a put to the financier at
$110,000, and the financier writes a call to the seller at $110,000
97
(this is the right side of Equation 3).
Alternatively, the
landowner can sell the land for $100,000 and the buyer can rent
the land to the seller, or someone else, for $10,000 (at the end of
the year). In this transaction, the puts and calls are written at
98
$100,000 (this is the right side of Equation 4).
In both
transactions, put-call parity is being used in an attempt to evade
the impact of mortgagor protections.
If merely changing the form of the transaction could negate
mortgagor protection provisions, then put-call parity would
provide an easy escape. However, courts are aware of disguised
mortgage transactions and will treat as mortgages those
99
transactions that are in substance, although not in form, loans.
100
This position, which goes back to the late nineteenth century,
is based on put-call parity inasmuch as the court recognizes such
a transaction as the economic equivalent of a loan, which
suggests that the court grasps, at least intuitively, put-call parity.

96 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 69, at ch. 3; Cunningham & Tischler,
supra note 92, at 1–2. The collateral agreement can be oral or written.
Cunningham & Tischler, supra note 92, at 1.
97 If the goal is to synthesize a nonrecourse loan, there is no put and the form of
the transaction is given by the right side of Equation 3'.
98 Once again, if there is no put, the transaction is equivalent to a nonrecourse
loan and the form of the transaction is given by the right side of Equation 4'.
99 Cunningham & Tischler, supra note 92, at 1–2.
100 The leading case is Pace v. Bartles, 20 A. 352, 359 (N.J. Ch. 1890).
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CONCLUSION
101

Recent years have seen an explosion of financial innovation.
Much of this innovation seeks to exploit inconsistencies in the
102
regulatory environment, and one popular technique that has
103
frequently been used for regulatory arbitrage is put-call parity.
Although put-call parity was first formally described only forty
104
years ago, for some time, economic historians have recognized
that some people appear to have had an intuitive understanding
of put-call parity before that relationship was formally described.
Nonetheless, scholars who study the history of financial
innovation had not traced the use of put-call parity back very far.
In this Article, I trace regulatory arbitrage using put-call parity
105
back to ancient Israel.
Two thousand years ago, financiers in
ancient Israel used put-call parity to evade the prohibition on
charging interest. Five hundred years ago, English financiers did
the same, which led to the development of the modern
mortgage. And today, Muslims living in the West use mortgage
substitutes that rely on put-call parity to avoid violating Islam’s
prohibition on paying interest. In addition, financiers sometimes
try to avoid the equity of redemption and statutory mortgagor
protections using put-call parity. Although modern observers
might recognize all of these transactions as applications of putcall parity, the ancient and medieval users of these transactions
had not heard of put-call parity. Yet, at some level some of
them must have understood the intuition behind put-call parity
because they developed, used, and debated the legality of
transactions based on that relationship.
No doubt, many significant financial innovations are distinctly
modern. However, others, including the use of put-call parity
for regulatory arbitrage, are of ancient origin.
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See supra notes 1–17 and accompanying text.
MILLER, supra note 8, at 5–9.
Knoll, supra note 17.
See Stoll, supra note 15.
See ROSS, WESTERFIELD & JAFFE, supra note 18, at 621.

